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0. 1 INTRODUCTION
This Executive Summary is an abstract of MATHEMATICA's
report, Economic Analysis of New Space Transportation Sjrstems of
31 May 1971, which was carried Out in accordance with the provisions
of Contract NASW-2081.
The study conducted by MATHEMATICA examines the economic
merits of three alternative Space Transportation Systemsl for use in the
decade of the 1980's:
O The Current Expendable System. The system envisages
continuing use of the types of expendable launch vehicles
in the United States inventory at present.
The New Expendable System. As its name implies, this
envisages use of a new family of expendable vehicles,
designed to have better (economic) performance than the
current expendable vehicles.
The Space Shuttle and Tug System (a new Space Trans-
portation System). This system differs in concept from
the previous systems in employing reusable rather than
expendable launch vehicles. Two major elements are
employed: a Space Shuttle which operates between the
Earth's surface and Earth orbits of altitudes between
185 and I, ii0 kilometers (i00 and 600 nautical miles);
a Space Tug, which can be transported within the Space
Shuttle and which can operate from the relatively low
orbits of the Space Shuttle to high Earth orbits such
A Glossary of Terms is included in the Report.
0-i
as the synchronous equatorial orbit (35,500 km or
19,230 n.m. altitude). The combined Space Shuttle and
Tug System provides a fully reusable launch system able
to place payloads into all widely used Earth orbits, and
to return payloads to Earth from these orbits.
The costs associated with reaching an Initial Operational Capa-
bility (IOC) with these three systems vary widely. The two expendable
systems represent modest investments by space program standards,
but the recurring costs of operation under them would remain relatively
high. The Space Shuttle and Tug System requires a substantial investment,
but would substantially reduce the recurring costs of operatiorr. The
impacts of the three systems on the costs of the space program of the
1980's also vary widely. MATHEMATICA has analyzed economic
benefits and costs of the different systems. The findings, as well as
the economic principles applied, are summarized herein.
Figure 0.1 shows the logic of the overall economic analysis
performed by MATHEMATICA and the context within which this analysis
should be seen as affecting the Space Shuttle decision. MATHEMATICA
submits that within this framework a consistent and detailed economic
analysis of the fully reusable Space Shuttle has been made. As Figure 0. 1
shows, there are other than economic factors that influence a decision
of the scope and character of the Space Shuttle; they have to do with
political criteria, the ranking of technological preferences, national
priorities and other non-economic criteria. The economic analysis is
but one important element to be considered in the approach to the
decisions relating to the development and use of a new Space Transpor-
tation System.
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Figure 0.1 The Role of Economic Analysis in the Evaluation of Public Projects
The study conducted by MATHEMATICA makes major use of
the results of the studies performed by two other contractors, LMSC
{Lockheed Missiles and Space Company} and Aerospace Corporation,
as well as facts, plans and assumptions provided by NASA and the
Department of Defense. Figure 0. Z shows the flow of inputs to the
economic analysis performed by MATHEMATICA.
The contributions of LMSC consisted primarily of estimates of
sample payload costs for the expendable and the resuable Space Trans-
portation Systems for the period 1978- 1990, based on extensive payload
preliminary designs. LMSC first performed an analysis of expected
payload costs based on historical experience to determine whether cost
reductions could be achieved. To accomplish this LMSC selected four
typical satellites and estimated their expected research, development,
test and evaluation (RDT&E) costs, first unit costs and operating costs
for each of the three Space Transportation Systems considered. Then
these four satellites were looked at in great detail at a subsystem level
and redesigned to correspond to the three major classes of satellites
anticipated for the 1980's space traffic. Aerospace Corporation then
used the results of the LMSC effort as a basis to generalize the payload
effects across the Baseline mission model supplied by NASA, which
incorporates traffic of NASA, the Department of Defense and other users.
Aerospace Corporation then provided MATHEIX4ATICA with the life
cycle cost streams from 1971 to 1990--RDT_E costs included--for the
Current Expendable launch vehicles and payloads, the New Expendable
launch vehicle family and payloads, and the fully reusable Space Shuttle
Transportation System based on a two-stage Space Shuttle and reusable
Space Tug configuration.
In recognition of the problems of accurately predicting the
rate of space activity more than a decade in the future, MATHE-
MATICA introduced many variations of the Baseline model which
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Contract NASW-2156, approximately IZ man-years of effort
Z
Contract NASW-ZI29, approximately 25 man-years of effort
3
Contract NASW-Z081, approximately 8 man-years of effort
0-5
resulted in analysis of twenty-six scenarios that bracket the most likely
possibilities for the 1978 - 1990 period. All of the aforesaid considera-
tions formed the basis on which MATHEMATICA performed the economic
analysis of the new, fully reusable Space Shuttle Transportation System.
It should be emphasized that the systems data used in the
analysis were generated for this study principally by NASA, by the
Department of Defense, by Aerospace Corporation, by LMSC and to
some extent by other contractors. They were not generated by MATHE-
MATICA. MATHEMATICA reviewed the data generated including the
Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs) used by the Aerospace Corporation
and is satisfied that they reflect current standards for such efforts and
represent the best procedures available at this time.
Aerospace Corporation stated that it tested its cost estimating
relationships by estimating costs of well known aerospace systems
with good approximation of actual costs. On the other hand, it must be
recognized that the fully reusable Space Shuttle Transportation System
advances major new areas of technology, and therefore involves cost
uncertainties not easily related to present aircraft or spacecraft costs.
The analysis is based on data published by Aerospace
Corporation in Integrated Operations/Payloads/Fleet Analysis, Mid-
Term Report, (6 Volumes), dated 31 March 1971. Aerospace
Corporation plans to publish an update of these data in June 1970.
MATHEMATICA will undertake a study to assess the impact of the
updated data on the findings of this report.
MATHEMATICA is continuing its validation of the cost data
and the details of their aggregation from individual components to
larger units.
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MATHEMATICA has designed the model for the benefit-cost
analysis into which the data provided for MATHEMATICA have been
inserted. This model is comprehensive and takes into account the
relevant concepts provided by advanced, modern economic analysis.
The present model has been modified and expanded for general use in
cost effectiveness analyses of new Space Transportation Systems (STS).
In the Report only expendable launch vehicle systems and the
fully reusable, two-stage Space Shuttle and Tug System are considered.
An economic evaluation of other viable alternative concepts has as yet
not been made by MATHEMATICA. Assessment of the cost effective-
ness of other Space Shuttle configurations to determine the most
economic choice can be performed in accordance with the methodology
of this analysis, once technical validation is accomplished and comparable
technical performance and cost data are available.
0-7
0.2 STATEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM
NASA is studying the development of a new, fully reusable
Space Shuttle Transportation System for the 1980's to replace its
Current Expendable Space Transportation System. Table 0. 1 gives
the complete life cycle cost summary of launch vehicle systems and
payloads for the alternative Space Transportation Systems considered
in this study. The two-stage, fully reusable Space Shuttle System as
estimated by Aerospace Corporation on March 31st, 1971 is
expected to have non-recurring launch vehicle costs of approximately
$1Z. 8 billion (RDT&E and initial fleet investment costs) in constant
1970 dollars. (Section 0.3.7. See also p. 0-31.). In terms of past
historical experience in either NASA or the Department of Defense,
this is a major research and development project--about half of the
cost of the Apollo program of the 1960's--and, therefore, deserves
very careful examination and scrutiny.
Any investment in large scale RDT&E projects has either or
•both of two major economic objectives:
(a) to develop a new good or service,
(b) to reduce (future) production and operating costs.
An example for (a) is the development of space transportation
capability in the United States during the 1950's and the 1960's. Today
the United States has an Earth orbital space transportation capability
and the aim of future RDT&E outlays is mainly (b), that is, the
expected reduction of space activity costs; however, added capabilities
are also anticipated from such a program.
0-8
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Table O. 1
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS
LIFE CYCLE COST SUMMARY
(Scenario I)
(in Millions of Undiscounted 1970 Dollars)
Space I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Expected Launch Vehicle Costs
RDT&E (FY 1971-1980)
Investment (FY 1973- 1990)
TOTAL NON-RECURRING
Recurring Costs (FY 1978-1990)
TOTAL LAUNCH COSTS Z
Expected Payload Costs
(Satellite s)
RDT&E (FY 1974-1990)
Recurring Costs (FY 1976-1990)
TOTAL PAYLOAD COSTS 2
EXPECTED TOTAL SPACE
PROGRAM COSTS Z
Current
Expendable
New
Expendable
$ 960
584
i,544
13,115
$ i, 185
727
1,912
IZ, 981
Shuttle
& Tug
$ 9,920
Z, 884
iZ, 804 .
S,510
$15,ooo $15,ooo $18,ooo
11,179
28,896
12,382
31,254
10,070
15,786
$44, ooo $40,000 $26,000
$58,ooo $55,000 $44,000
1
Table Z gives a breakdown of these costs over time.
Z
Small zeroes indicate rounding to nearest billion.
0-9
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In the case of the Space Shuttle and Tug System, the ex-
pected cost reductions in the 1980's will occur in two major areas: I
first, the launch system recurring costs will be reduced from $13 billion
total to $5.5 billion due to the repeated use of the launch system. I
Second, the cost of payloads--the major portion of space program costs--
will be reduced from about $40 billion to $26 billion due to the reuse, l
refurbishment and updating of payloads. Once the Space Shuttle System
is in operation the total direct costs of the national space program will
consist of the recurring launch costs and the total (i. e. , non-recurring
plus recurring) costs of the payloads to be carried. Table 0. 1 illustrates E
that recurring launch costs make up about 20 percent or less of space
program costs (1978-1990), while 80 percent or more are due to the J
total cost of payloads. Therefore, an economic analysis of the New
Space Transportation System has to look at payload costs as the major
part of total space program costs, and not only at launch costs.
m
In economic terms the problem can be stated as follows: What
must the future savings in space program costs (launch--as well as pay-
[]loads) be to justify an RDT&E and Initial Investment outlay on the Space
Shuttle of, say, $13 billion? Or, as illustrated in Figure 0.3, one can
I
ask the reverse question: considering the expected cost of the national
space program using an Expendable Space Transportation System in the []
B
1978 - 1990 period and given the expected savings in the operating phase
of space programs with the Space Shuttle System, both launch costs and B
i
payload costs considered, what are the justifiable non-recurring costs
of New Space Transportation System concepts? A convenient way to B
R
illustrate all the possible economic configurations of recurring versus
non-recurring costs of different technologies is shown by the trade-off I
R
line in Figure 0.3. Estimates and configurations below the trade-off
line are, in economic terms, better than the Current Expendable Systen_, B
m
while configurations of non-recurring costs and recurring cost estimates
above the trade-off line are worse than the expected Expendable System costs.
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Figure O. 3 STS Recurring vs. Non-Recurring Launch
Cost Trade-Offs at Given Discount Rate
e. g. , i0 percent, Payload Effects and
Space Transportation Activity.
For Space flights that require the Space Tug,
be added.
$0.46 million have to
2
In the expendable case the Upper Stage Costs have to be included, where
required. They vary from $2.5 million to $5.0 million.
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Figure 0.3 shows the trade-off line between the i _nch costs
for one additional flight and the expected non-recurring co_ts of
different systems. Underlying each of these regions of economic
choice shown in Figure 0.3 is a very complicated and extensive set
of cost estimates, demand estimates, and estimates of other economic
variables influencing system choice which will be listed subsequently
and which are analyzed in detail in the main Report, Chapters 2.0
and 6. O.
The costs may be subdivided into two major broad categories:
I
I
I
I
i
(a) The non-recurring costs associated with the RDT&E and
investment phase, including both launch vehicle and payload costs.
(b) The recurring costs per mission or per year for both
the expendable and the fully reusable system after the Initial Operating
Capability (IOC) date, again including both launch vehicle and payload
costs.
Figure 0.3 does allow for the correct adjustment of the trade-
off line for payload effects (see 2.4 and 2.6) I. The fully reusable
Space Shuttle and Tug Transportation System is shown with an estimated
non-recurring cost of $12.8 billion and an estimated cost per launch
(based on incremental costs) of $4.6 million. Alternate (Hybrid)
systems that consist of both expendable and reusable elements may
have a wide range in expected non-recurring and recurring costs: the
one shown has $7 billion in non-recurring costs and a recurring cost
per launch of $8 million, again on an incremental cost basis. The
Expendable systems would also have an associated non-recurring cost,
to meet mission requirements of the 1980's, of about $i. 5 billion, but
an expected cost per launch of $13. 1 million--averaged over a large
family of expendable rockets (from $3.2 million to $27.0 million, see
1
These numbers, as well as similar subsequent numbers, refer
to sections in the Main Report.
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Chapter 6.0, Table 6.3). An analysis comparing the cost of Expendable
systems to expected costs of the Space Shuttle and Tug was made on a
mission-by-mission and payload-by-payload basis. The figures shown
in the summary graph are aggregate, averaged figures. The regions
around the point estimates indicate the uncertainty in non-recurring
and recurring cost estimates of the various systems.
The particular trade-off line in Figure 0.3 was drawn based on
i
a I0 percent social rate of discount. There are a set of other economic
factors that influence the location, the shape, and the slope of the trade-
off line in Figure 0.3; among these are the level of demand for space
transportation and the magnitude of payload effects for different systems.
Figure 0.4 illustrates the space program cost streams (annual
cost vs. time) associated with the Space Shuttle System and with the
Current Expendable System. It reflects the space program activities of
the mission model established by NASA and by the Department of Defense
for this study. Figure 0.4 summarizes the total life cycle costs for
RDT&E, investment and operations phases of both launch vehicles and
payloads.
MATHEMATICA introduced considerable variations to these
activities, called Scenarios, to cover a broad range of space transporta-
tion demand in the 1980's. In Table 0. Z the Scenario I (NASA and DoD
Baseline model) life cycle cost summary data are presented for the Space
Shuttle System. The cost data are given by year from 1971 to 1990 for
launch vehicle RDT&E, initial fleet and operation costs as well as for
payload RDT&E and operation costs. Total costs are also shown for each
year and for each category, all in undiscounted 1970 dollars.
I
The social rate of discount is discussed in Section 0.3.3.
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Table 0.2
LIFE CYCLE COST SUMMARY DATA
SCENARIO 1 -. NASA ÷ DOD BASELINE MODEL
SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEM
(MILLIONS OF UNDISCOUNTED 1970 DOLLARS)
0
I'
un
FISCAL
YEAR
1971
1972
1973
1974
1972
1976
1977
1976
1979
19_0
1981
19_2
1983
1984
1985
1986
1997
1988
1989
1990
TCTAL
NON-RECURRING COSTS
LAUNCH VEHICLE PAYLOAD
RDT&E INVEST. ROT&E
18 0 0
492 0 0
1528 0 0
2289 0 33
23q4 32 262
1914 85 1198
970 314 1814
365 533 II01
0 800 650
0 613 551
0 310 617
0 74 796
0 49 883
0 49 894
0 25 591
0 0 242
0 0 i13
0 0 149
0 0 137
0 0 39
9920 2884 10070
RECURRING COSTS
LAUNCH PAYLOAD
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 465
0 1526
678 1690
365 1205
415 970
364 906
409 891
364 1059
381 1272
420 1480
479 1364
386 1143
437 930
366 686
446 199
5510 15786
TOTAL
18
492
1528
2322
2638
3662
4624
4367
3020
2549
2197
2170
2355
2596
2516
2085
1642
1516
1189
684
44170
0.3 ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES APPLIED IN THE ANALYSIS
Given the expected reductions in space transportation system
costs in the 1980's, MATHEMATICA analyzed the circumstances and
consequences of an investment inra New Space Transportation System
made in the 1970's. For this, total life cycle costs of the investment
were used. MATHEMATICA gave additional attention to the costs per
flight for the different Space Transportation Systems and their effect
upon the demand for space transportation in the 1980's. For the purpose
of considering efficient use of alternative transportation systems the
incremental costs of space flights are relevant. The actual pricing
policy of flight operations is subject to institutional constraints and one
has a variety of choices, ranging from total cost recovery down to recovery
of incremental cost per flight only; it could also be based on demand elasti-
cities of users. However, the two problems of cost effectiveness and
demand analysis (for pricing strategy) should not be confused with each other.
The principal economic considerations are the following:
0.3.1 Cost Effectiveness Analyses.
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Under cost effectiveness analyses, in a strict sense, MATHE-
MATICA includes only those economic analyses that use a definition of
economic benefits which are either directly or indirectly derived from
expected cost savings between alternative systems. Within cost effective-
ness analyses MATHEMATICA chose two alternative and equally valid
approaches that lead to different economic results:
a. Equal Capability Effectiveness. These cost effectiveness
analyses assume that the same demand (capability) has
to be met. Estimates of the net cost savings are made
K
|
i
|
|
0-16
that can be achieved when introducing new technology.
These cost savings are then compared to the expected
outlay of RDT&E and hardware costs of the new system.
In Figure 0.5a the approach is illustrated (see Chapter
z. o).
b. Equal Budget Effectiveness. These analyses assess
whether the direct cost savings implied by (a) above
and increases in the demand for space transportation
induced by the new system up to the same annual budget
level justify the expected RDT&E and initial fleet invest-
ment over the complete uselife of the new system. The
new system is operated with the same budget level that
the existing technology requires to meet the space trans-
portation capabilities within each scenario. This
approach is indicated in Figure 0.5b (see Chapter 2.0).
Figures 0.5a and 0.5b illustrate these two types of cost effective-
ness analyses. Neither approach considers potential additional benefits
and options that a fully reusable Space Transportation System can offer
the Nation, i.e. , capabilities that with the Expendable rocket technology
simply are not achievable for technical reasons. In making cost effective-
ness analyses in this strict sense, one need only make the assumptions
that prior to the development of the New Space Transportation System
society is willing to spend, say, $3 billion to place 46 payloads into orbit,
per year, (this was the average over the years from 1963 to 1970 for the
unmanned programs, excluding the manned space program completely)
and that the projected space budget for NASA and the Department of
Defense jointly is being spent in an efficient way.
0-17
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Equal Budget Analysis, NASA, DoD and Other Users
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This means that with the existing technology, sizeable cost
savings cannot be achieved for the same program capabilities either in
the Department of Defense or in the science and applications programs
of NASA.
Equal capability analyses and equal budget analyses were per-
formed for a whole range of expected space programs, from 450 to
900 flights, over a 13-year (1978-1990) period for expendable and
fully reusable systems. The range of space programs (scenarios)
considered is described further in the quantitative summary,
Section O. 4.
0.3.2 The Measurement of Induced Benefits from
Incremental Spa ce Activities.
When performing "Equal Budget" analyses one has to allow
for one basic axiom of economic theory: the decreasing marginal
value of goods and services. In keeping with this fundamental
principle, as additional missions are added to the existing space
program, they increase the total value received by society, by the
agency, or by the scientific community; however, the increment
in utility received by society or the consumer will be decreasing as
the number of missions increases. This holds for NASA, for the
Department of Defense, and for other government agencies. The
assumptions made for the "Equal Budget" analyses in measuring
the benefits of additional space flights beyond those undertaken with
the Expendable Space Transportation System in the 1980's are
illustrated in Figure 0.6. The horizontal axis shows the number of
space flights demanded per year, and the vertical axis shows the price
or cost per space flight, including payload costs, (Ignoring, correctly,
fixed costs and considering incremental costs; see 0.3.6.). The
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direct benefits are the cost savings if the Space Shuttle would
undertake the same missions (equal capability) as those done under
the Expendable Space Transportation System. The demand curve
which goes through P0 was constructed under the assumption of a
constant budget for NASA and the Department of Defense space
activities, launching all the space flights possible within the limits of
a given budget. The downward sloping demand curve, therefore,
shows a constant U.S. space expenditure; it reflects how changes in
the cost per space flight (launch costs and payload costs considered
in combination) influence the number of flights demanded with such an
assumption. If the nominal cost savings of the Space Shuttle System
compared to current technology had been included in the equal budget
analyses as a benefit, then a considerable overestimate of the
"benefits" of the New Space Transportation System would result.
In general, the "Equal Capability" analyses are the most
conservative way of looking at the economic efficiency of New Space
Transportation Systems. The "Equal Budget" analyses do allow, in
part, for the increased activity to be expected by lower cost systems.
The lower and upper limits of space activities for the economic analyses
were determined within the context of the history of space flights in the
1960's for the United States and for the Soviet Union, as illustrated in
the summary charts in Section 0.4 of this Executive Summary.
MATHEMATICA tested the constant budget hypothesis on the
example of Department of Defense payloads in the 1960's and found an
elasticity of demand exceeding that implied by the constant budget
hypothesis. This would indicate that demand for space transportation
in the 1980's with the Space Shuttle System may well be larger than that
indicated by the Equal Budget demand curve. To the extent possible
O-Zl
the precise shape and location of the demand curve should be established
but its determination is a major task.
0.3.3. The Social Rate of Discount.
No proper investment analysis is possible, whether private
or public investment is considered, without using a discount or interest
rate. For private investment the interest rates in the capital market
provide the critical information. For public investment the correct
rate is more difficult to determine because the allocation of resources
both to and within the government is directed only in part by the forces
of the market.
For the government sector the social rate of discount fulfills
the function of the interest rate in the private capital market. It reflects
the sacrifice that is borne by the economy when resources are
withdrawn from other production or consumption in the economy and
are instead transferred to a public investment project. MATHEMATICA
analyzed the investment alternatives of the Space Transportation
•Systems for discount rates ranging from 1 percent to Z0 percent.
The discount rates included in this Summary concentrate mainly
around the I0 percent rate of discount. For purposes of comparison,
results are also given for 5 percent and 15 percent rates of discount.
The i0 percent social rate of discount used for the summary of
MATHEMATICA's results is among the highest discount rates used
in the federal government for the evaluation of an investment project
of this type. The use of the I0 percent rate, therefore, is a very
conservative way to evaluate the economics of the Space Shuttle
System.
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A survey of the major government agencies for Fiscal
Year 1969 indicates a wide variation in the use or non-use of
social rates of discount for the evaluation of public research and
development projects. The rates used by government agencies
varied between 0 percent, i. e., the use of no discount rate
to a concentration among major agencies around 4 percent to 5
percent. For some projects, mainly of the Department of Defense,
the rates used were 10 percent or more. One of the major advances,
yet to be achieved, is the use of a single discount rate to evaluate
public investment projects across government agencies. In the light
of the present usage, the 10 percent rate used by MATHEMATICA
is among the highest applied. A survey of the recommended social
rates of discount by economists again leads to the conclusion that a
10 percent rate ranks among the highest rates suggested by
different economists. A survey, extending from 1958 to the present,
of the rates suggested by economists indicates a range from 4 percent
to 13.5 percent. Only two economists out of fifteen suggested in
the published literature rates in excess of 10 percent.
One must emphasize that the 10 percent social discount rate
was applied to constant 1970 dollars and not to an inflated benefit
stream in current dollars over the 1970's and 1980's. This fact adds
further conservatism to the economic analysis performed for the New
Space Transportation System.
The higher the social rate of discount applied to a project,
whether private or public, the less likely is the economic acceptance of
such a project. Figure 0.7 shows the net present value of an invest-
ment project such as the Space Shuttle as a function of the discount
rate applied to the benefit and cost stream over the expected lifetime of
the project.
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The problems of estimating the discount rate from empirical
data, the problem of ranking alternative projects, and the uses and
misuses of the internal rate of return have been discussed in
1
considerable detail in this Report and in an earlier paper. The matter
is somewhat intricate and for th e purposes of a summary we shall
not repeat the discussion here. The correct intuitive interpretation
of the social discount rate can, however, be explained as follows:
When the government undertakes a public investment project, the
resources absorbed by the project must necessarily be withdrawn from
the pool of investment and consumption resources in the economy.
The government can justify the transfer of the resources to a particular
project only if it can put these resources to a more productive use than
the private sector could have achieved with them. In the case of the
Space Shuttle System, this applies to the $12.8 billion for RDT&E and
Initial Fleet costs. The opportunity costs of using the resources for
the public sector are the foregone benefits that would have been pro-
duced with these resources by the private sector. The social rate of
discount reflects the magnitude of these opportunity costs for government
•investment projects.
Though MATHEMATICA also shows in the summaries the
results for the 5 percent and 15 percent discount rates applied to the
Space Shuttle investment decision, we, nevertheless, recommend 10
percent and draw our conclusion based on the i0 percent social discount
rate applied to the different space programs.
I
Heiss,K. P., Reinhardt, U. , "On the Principles of Public
Project Evaluation, " Volume i, Cost Benefit Analysis of New Launch
_Systems, MATHEMATICA, prepared for the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, Princeton, N.J. , July 17, 1970.
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0.3.4. The Uselife of RDT&E Investments in the I
Space Transportation System. []
The economic uselife of an investment project is normally
something short of infinity. This is so because the typical investment
project ceases to have economic value when the physical uselife of
the project ends. The technology created with the development of the
Space Shuttle, however, does not vanish. MATHEMATICA submits
that, after careful consideration of all the issues involved in choosing
between a finite or an infinite uselife for RDT&E investments, the
selection of an infinite uselife for such projects is the correct
procedure.
To limit the uselife of these expenditures to, say, the year
1990 assumes that all scientific and technical knowledge used as part of
the Space Shuttle development will be lost by 1990, and that the develop-
ment of whatever new system might be built in 1990 will not have
to draw on such knowledge and not have to prove cost effectiveness
compared to the 1978 Space Shuttle, but rather the Expendable systems
of the 1960's and 1970's. Such an assumption is obviously not realistic
and would lead to a serious understatement of the true economic value
I
I
I
I
I
I
of RDT&E investment activities.
0.3.5. Other Economic Parameters: Program Start,
Gestation Period and the Initial Operational
Capability Date.
In most cost effectiveness analyses the program start and
gestation period, as well as the initial operational capability of the sys-
tem to be developed, are very important variables affecting the cost
effectiveness of alternative systems. MATHEMATICA has allowed in
the analysis for a considerable variation in the gestation period of the
0-26
RDT&E program, the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date, and the
program start of the Space Shuttle. The gestation period of the Space
Shuttle program was extended by up to 50 percent of the time estimate
of the present development schedule. With regard to the IOC date and
the slippage of the development program, delays in the IOC date of one
and two years have been considered by MATHEMATICA. Although
delays in each of these variables (the program start, the lengths of the
gestation period, and the IOC date) do influence negatively the net
present value of the Space Shuttle investment project, none of them has
sufficiently significant effects, within the limits analyzed by MATHE-
MATICA, to change the decision to accept or reject the Space Shuttle
investment. However, the conclusion has to be based on a careful
understanding of the complete methodology of the economic analysis.
Data points for the evaluation of such space programs are included in
the summary charts and the results are reflected in the general
economi c finding s.
0.3.6. The Incremental Costs of Space Flights in the 1980's
of Different Space Transportation Systems.
Table 0.3 presents an economic breakdown of the launch
vehicle life cycle costs of the Space Shuttle and Tug. The total costs
are classified into non-recurring and recurring costs. While the non-
recurring costs are independent of activity level, the recurring costs
may be further classified into activity-level dependent (incremental)
and activity-level independent costs.
For the fully reusable Space Transportation System, the
incremental or marginal cost is estimated to be $4.6 million per launch
for the Space Shuttle and $0.46 million for the Space Tug. Costs
0-Z7
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RDT&E program, the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) date, and the
program start of the Space Shuttle. The gestation period of the Space
Shuttle program was extended by up to 50 percent of the time estimate
of the present development schedule. With regard to the IOC date and
the slippage of the development program, delays in the IOC date of one
and two years have been considered by MATHEMATICA. Although
delays in each of these variables (the program start, the lengths of the
gestation period, and the IOC date) do influence negatively the net
present value of the Space Shuttle investment project, none of them has
sufficiently significant effects, within the limits analyzed by MATHE-
MATICA, to change the decision to accept or reject the Space Shuttle
investment. However, the conclusion has to be based on a careful
understanding of the complete methodology of the economic analysis.
Data points for the evaluation of suchspace programs are included in
the summary charts and the results are reflected in the general
economic finding s.
0.3.6. The Incremental Costs of Space Flights in the 1980's
of Different Space Transportation Systems.
Table 0.3 presents an economic breakdown of the launch
vehicle life cycle costs of the Space Shuttle and Tug. The total costs
are classified into non-recurring and recurring costs. While the non-
recurring costs are independent of activity level, the recurring costs
may be further classified into activity-level dependent (incremental)
and activity-level independent costs.
For the fully reusable Space Transportation System, the
incremental or marginal cost is estimated to be $4.6 million per launch
for the Space Shuttle and $0.46 million for the Space Tug. Costs
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independent of activity level are not relevant when measuring the
incremental costs. One could calculate average costs of space flights
by considering the flights of an arbitrary 10 to 13 year space program
and allocating to them the total RDT&E costs as well as the initial
fleet and operating costs, whichwould then lead to figures ranging
from $25 million to $30 million per launch. The use of this average
as a price would prevent the Nation from using the Space Shuttle
optimally. The examination of this assertion is presented in
Appendix A to Chapter 1.0.
Figure O. 8 illustrates the difference between (a) total average
cost, (b) the average operating cost, and (c) the incremental cost for
Space Shuttle flights. On the horizontal axis we show again the number
of Space Shuttle flights, and on the vertical axis the cost per launch
of those flights. While total average costs range from $24 million to
$18 million as a function of expected Space Shuttle flights, and average
operating costs range from $7.1 million to $6.0 million, several
alternative calculations of the incremental costs of additional Space
Shuttle flights ranging over many different flight levels, indicate that
the incremental cost of Space Shuttle flights is $4.6 million (see Z. 5.4. ).
This is the cost incurred when launching an additional flight, e.g. ,
when increasing the flights from 56 to 57 per year. The incremental
costs of Space Shuttle flights prove to be very close to this figure
when different approaches are taken to determine incremental costs.
Also, the incremental costs are found to be constant over a large
range of flight levels.
For Expendable launch vehicles the incremental costs per
flight are much higher, and close to their average total operating cost.
The main reason for this is that with each expendable launch all the flight
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hardware (and associated testing) is "thrown away. " Chapter 6.0 and
Table 6.3 of the Report detail the cost range of the Expendable launch
vehicles. These costs range from $3.2 million (Scout) to $27.0 million
(Titan III LZ/Centaur).
When selecting the vehicle assignments (between Expendables
and Space Shuttles), one has to include the different mission costs due
".
to payload effects in addition to the incremental launch costs of the
Expendable and the fully reusable Space Shuttle and Tug Systems. The
process by which vehicle assignments are made on the basis of incre-
mental costs is called "capture analysis. " A complete set of these,
i.e., choice of Space Shuttle or Expendable modes, has been performed
on the Space Shuttle and Tug Transportation System. Analyses of the
sensitivity of system selection to changes in incremental costs of the
Space Shuttle and Tug System have also been performed in the context
of mission capture analyses and are further described in Chapters 2.0
and 6.0 of the Report.
0.3.7. Risk and Uncertainty.
First and foremost, in terms of the acceptability of the Space
Shuttle investment, must loom the estimate and the accuracy of the non-
recurring costs in the 1970's to develop a fully reusable New Space
Transportation System. Different system configurations which would
provide a reusable capability are associated with different levels of
research and development efforts as well as initial fleet requirements.
With regard to the selection of the best system, the effects of these
differences have yet to be fully evaluated. Nevertheless, MATHEMATICA
believes that the present estimate for the non-recurring costs of the
Space Shuttle and Tug System, as used in the Report, should not be
equated with either a "political" price to get the Space Shuttle accepted
0-31
or with very early estimates of non-recurring costs of research and ..
development investments.
The estimates of the non-recurring costs of the Space Shuttle
and Tug System have changed significantly over the past two years.
RDT&E costs of the Space Shuttle and Tug System have shifted from
the early estimates of $5.2 billion (Space Task Group Report,
September 1969) to $9.3 billion (Aerospace Corporation, March 31,
1971). 1 Although further changes in the estimated RDT&E, and the
Initial Fleet costs of the Space Shuttle and Tug System will occur,
IVIATHEMATICA feels that with an efficiently managed development
program of the Space Shuttle and Tug System, the cost escalation
experience of the early and middle 1960's should not apply to the present
non-recurring cost estimates of the Space Shuttle System. This holds
in particular if the non-recurring cost estimates are all made in con-
stant 1970 dollars and, therefore, eliminate the artificial effects of
inflationary cost escalation that will continue to occur in the 1970's.
MATHEMATICA has also performed a cost uncertainty analysis
of the Space Shuttle cost savings to be expected in the 1980's. It should
be recalled that the major advantage of the New Space Transportation
System, when compared to the Expendable mode, lies in the following
areas:
(a)
(b)
The reduction in: First, payload RDT&E costs; second,
payload first unit costs; third, the costs of space
programs after 1978 upon inclusion of reuse, refurbish-
ment and update of payloads, made possible by the
Space Shuttle System.
In comparison with the Expendable Space Transportation
System, the Space Shuttle and Tug System has lower launch
costs.
1
Both estimates expressed in 1970 dollars.
0-3Z
!
!
I
!
i
!
|
!
|
|
|
|
I
!
|
!
I
!
|
I
I
I
!
I
I
I
I
I
!
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
However, these expected cost savings are in the future and by
their very nature relatively uncertain as to their particular level as well
as to the time by which they can be realized. MATHEMATICA hs.s
applied risk analysis methods to the payload and Space Shuttle launch
cost streams classified as "activity level dependent" costs. Although
the estimation of cost uncertainties will, admittedly, always remain an
area of major concern, by applying techniques of risk analysis to the
recurring cost streams of the Space Shuttle, MATHEMATICA found the
Space Shuttle investment unquestionably superior to the New Expendable
System at a 5 percent social discount rate and calculated an 0.86 proba-
bility that the Space Shuttle investment will have a rate of return of at
I
least I0 percent. Although by the very nature of large scale KDT&E
projects as exemplified by the Space Shuttle investment, an element of
uncertainty will persist, the analytic tools available show that the Space
Shuttle investment is confirmed to be economically acceptable.
On the other side, there is an additional consideration which
favors a Space Shuttle System: the mission reliability as measured by
the initial assured functioning of the payload in orbit is significantly
higher than that of expendable systems. Empirical evidence shows that
the majority of failures of payloads occur very early, within the first
several days from launch; these failures can--for all practical purposes--
be eliminated by the Space Shuttle System through in-orbit checkout
before payload release. This benefit has not been allowed for in this
study. It may have a major effect on the commercial and national
security demand for space activities in the 1980's, favoring the Space
Shuttle System.
1
In other words, the analysis will show a breakeven on present
value at a social discount rate of at least i0 percent.
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0.4 SUMMARY OF THE QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
OF THE ECONOMIC ANALYSES
MATHEMATICA evaluated a range of space programs covering
the expected range of space activities in the 1980's, on the basis of con-
servative projections of the history of United States space flights in the
1960's. I
In this Report the term "space program" is defined as a parti-
cular combination of NASA, Department of Defense, and commerical I
space applications. The term "space program" is used interchangeably
with the term "scenario. " "Space program costs" (the costs of a I
scenario) as used in this Report include the cost of development, con-
struction, launch and operation, and payloads. These costs also allow I
for the associated support costs such as the cost of launch sites. Excluded
are general administrative costs. I
The space programs analyzed by MATHEMATICA cover widely I
different m_es of scientific, defense, and commercial applications of
space. About thirty different space programs for the 1980's were analyzed I
with regard to their economic effects on the choice between Current
Expendable technology and a fully reusable Space Transportation System. I
The payloads and traffic of the Baseline Mission Model (with wide varia-
tions provided by the scenarios) and the various Space Transportation I
System concepts are described in detail in Chapters Z.0, 4.0 and 5.0.
The space program identified as Scenario 1 (736 missions over I
13 years, with an average of 56 missions per year, see also Figure 0.4)
describes the program requirements established for this study by NASA I
and the Department of Defense for the 1980's. This program includes a
substantial Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA) budget, a I
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Department of Defense budget in line with current projections of the
Department of Defense, commerciai space applications of about
$300 million a year, and manned space flight activities of only $200 million
per year on the average (that is, only Space Station support missions of
four to five flights per year were included). Cost streams were estimated
for Current Expendable and fully reusable Space Transportation Systems.
These cost streams include both launch vehicle and payload costs
(RDTS_E, investment and operating costs). (See Figures 0.4, 0. 17, 0. 18,
0.19 and Tables 0.2 and 0.3. ) The cost streams were then used as a
basis for the different cost effectiveness analyses.
Figure 0.9 summarizes results of "Equal Capability" cost analy-
ses of the fully reusable Space Shuttle. On the horizontal axis a great
variety of alternative, postulated space programs are ranked in ascending
order based on the average number of flights they imply. The vertical
1
axis shows the economically justifiable (or allowable) reusable launch
vehicle RDT&E and Investment costs (in undiscounted 1970 dollars)
associated with these alternative space programs. By economically
"justifiable" cost in this context is meant the maximum RDT&E and
Investment outlays which could be incurred without depressing the net
present value of the reusable Space Transportation System, (i.e. , the
present value of all future benefits minus the present value of all costs
associated with the reusable Space Transportation System) to a level below
zero, at a I0 percent discount rate. All the benefits attributable to this
investment--i, e., cost savings in the recurring launch costs and all of
the expected payload cost savings (RDT&E included)--are reflected in the
1
The upward-sloping line in Figure 0.9 is a least-squares fit
to a number of points closely scattered along this line with an R Z of
better than 0.99.
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"EQUAL CAPABILITY" COST ANALYSES (10% DISCOUNT RATE)
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evaluation of these allowable non-recurring launch vehicle costs, as a
function of either the flight level or the annual space budget levels. The
$1Z. 8 billion lines reflect the 31 March 1971 estimate of these non-
recurring costs. Therefore, any particular point on the upward sloping
line indicates, on the vertical axis, quite closely, the maximum allow-
able RDT&E and Investment costs for transportation vehicles associated
with the corresponding average annual traffic flow on the horizontal axis.
As an example, the 1964- 1969 U. S. traffic equivalent is represented
by an annual traffic of 51 Space Shuttle flights. This is equal to 663
flights over the 1978 to 1990 period. The allowable RDT&E and Invest-
1
ment costs for this traffic rate are $15.8 billion. (See Figures 0. 14
and 0.16). The 1965 - 1970 equivalent traffic of the USSR was 65 flights
per year. This amounts to 845 flights over the 1978- 1990 period. If
this rate were projected for the United States a total of $20 billion in
RDT&E and Investment costs could be incurred for the Space Shuttle
System without reducing the net present value of the Space Shuttle System
to a level below zero, i.e. , without rendering the Space Shuttle System
economically unjustifiable. Any other point on the upward-sloping line
is to be interpreted analogously. Thus, as long as the allowable non-
recurring Space Shuttle System costs exceed the actual, estimated non-
recurring costs ($12.8 billion), the Space Shuttle System is economically
better than the Expendable System. The level of space activity (over
13 years) where allowable and actual costs are equal is identified as
"break-even point. "
MATHEMATICA's Baseline space program for the 1980's,
identified in Figure 0.9 as Scenario 3, contains an OSSA budget using
the Expendable System of about $900 million for Z0 flights per year.
This is one-half of the budget and traffic for OSSA projected by
Scenario I, the NASA-DoD Baseline model.
Total absolute funding level over about ten years.
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The Department of Defense budget of about $i. Z billion and 28
flights per year on the average, as well as the commercial applications
and manned space flight programs, are the same as those of Scenario i.
The other scenarios are variations around the MATHEMATICA Baseline
space program for the 1980's. Of particular interest are Scenarios Z3
and 24 which reflect historical levels of space funding for OSSA and the
Department of Defense, with commercial and other civil applications
and manned space flight activities at the level of MATHEMATICA's
Baseline space program only. Scenario 23 is based on the 1963 to 1971
average funding level for the different agencies, while Scenario 24
projects for the 1980's a space program based on the funding levels of
Fiscal Years 1970 and 1971--historical low points for recent United
States space activities.
Even though the different space programs include (i) a drastic
variation in the mix of activities between OSSA, the Department of
Defense, and commercial applications; (Z) a variation in the phase-in
of the Space Shuttle--the period between 1978 and 1984 was considered;
and (3) different build-up rates, we find an extremely good fit of the
different economic results to the line shown in Figure 0.9. One would
have expected a wider scatter of the economic answers from benefit-cost
analyses of these different programs. If this had been the case, the
defined measure of capability by which the space programs were ranked--
i. e., the number of space flights--would not have been sufficient to
adequately describe and measure the costs of space activities. In that
case one would have to estimate not only the overall level of space
transportation activities for the 1980's relatively accurately, but also
the actual composition of the 1980's space flight programs as they
divide up into defense, science and commercial and other civil
applications.
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In constructing the scenarios the same relative cost distribu-
tion of payloads was maintained within each agency. As the different
space programs also covered options including and excluding manned
space flights the results are divorced from the issue of manned versus
unmanned space exploration although all systems considered maintained
a manned space flight capability. The results of the economic analyses
indicate that a decision on a future manned program is not required to
justify or reject the fully reusable Space Transportation System for
the 1980's.
What this implies is that the complete set of economic analyses
(methodologies and results), presented in Chapters 2.0 and 7.0 of the
Report, lend themselves to reliable conclusions with regard to the
economic desirability of Space Transportation Systems, once the overall
demand for space transportation in the 1980's can be established.
Furthermore, given the detailed descriptions of the space pro-
grams (scenarios), the space history of the United States, and projections
of space activities over the 1970's and 1980's in NASA and the Department
of Defense--with a potential underestimate of commercial applications--
one can draw reasonably accurate conclusions of whether or not a New
Transportation System with reuse and refurbishment capability of pay-
loads is desirable, taking into account the expected budgetary environ-
ment for space applications in the 1970's and 1980's. MATHEMATICA
took the United States space flight activity from 1964 to 1969, and made
for the 1980's a similar 13-year average projection of space flight
activity--not in budgetary terms, but in numbers of flights only. We
see that this leads to an "Equal Capability" scenario of 663 flights,
roughly in the neighborhood of space programs of Scenarios 2, 7 and 8.
MATHEMATICA then took the historic funding level of United States
space flight activity by agency--excluding the manned space flight
0-39
program--between 1963 and 1971 as the basis for a budget constrained
analysis for the 1980's and again arrived at a flight level corresponding
exactly to the number of flights between 1964 and 1969. In the "bt{dget
constrained" case the number of possible flights, given the costestimates
for Current Expendable technology was found to be a 13-year total of
663 flights, or the exact 1964-1969 average of 51 United States flights
per year. Thus the agreement of these two analyses tends to support
the consistency of the economic analysis.
The results of the economic analysis are summarized in
Figures 0.9 to 0. 16.
Figure 0.9 shows the allowable non-recurring costs for
developing , testing and producing the fleet of necessary, fully reusable
vehicles as a function of the numbers of flights from 1978 on, with the
total flights shown over a 13-year horizon, and using a discount rate of
10 percent. The space flight level varies between 450 flights and 900
flights, the range covered by our analyses. Figure 0.9 shows the
allowable non-recurring costs in terms of the "Equal Capability" cost
effectiveness analysis (see 0.3.1). This line shows the case where
no allowance is made for increased space flight activities within each
space program due to the greater incentive of using a lower cost
Space Transportation System. It assumes that the space activities of
NASA, the Department of Defense, and commercial applications will
not increase at all when the costs of space missions are reduced by
nearly one-half! This is a very conservative way of evaluating any
economic investment. Figure 0.9 relates the cost savings of a fully
reusable Space Transportation System in the operating phase of the
program to the allowable non-recurring costs of developing such a
system.
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With the "Equal Capability" analysis, a non-recurring cost
for the new, fully reusable Space Transportation System of $12.8billion
(undiscounted 1970 dollars) would be justified, at I0 percent, with a
space flight program from 1978 to 1990 of 506 flights, or 39 flights
per year. We find that the range of allowable non-recurring costs
goes from $12. I billion in the case of Space Program 12 up to
$21.4 billion in the case of Space Program 5, the two extremes analyzed
by IV[ATHE_ATICA (38 flights per year up to 70 flights per year).
Space Program 3 --the program used by MATHEMATICA as its pro-
jection for the 1980's--gives an allowable non-recurring cost of
$14.5 billion (undiscounted 1970 dollars in all cases).
Two major points should be added here:
I. If a substantial manned space flight program were
added, the economic advantage of the Shuttle would improve.
Z. If a substantial lunar exploration program were to be
added to the options used in our analyses, significant reductions in
lunar space transportation costs could be expected from the Space
Shuttle. I Scenarios Z5 and 26 analyze the effects of such an option on
the economics of Scenarios i and 3. Figure 0.15 shows the effects of
such an option on the economic results of our analysis. Scenario Z5
included the NASA-DoD Baseline (Scenario I) and Lunar Option i; and
Scenario 26 includes the MATHEIVlATICA Baseline (Scenario 3) and
Lunar Option i. For both of these scenarios the launch costs of the
I
This reduction is due to both the increased advantage of the
Shuttle in expanded space programs, and the ability to use a i00 percent
load factor in flying hydrogen as a Space Shuttle payload.
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Space Shuttle are but one-third of the Current Expendable and New
Expendable cases. The Lunar option makes use of the Nuclear
Shuttle for Earth orbit to Lunar orbit flights.
Figure 0. i0 shows the allowable non-recurring costs for the
fully reusable Space Transportation System as a function of the annual
space program budget in terms of the "Equal Budget" cost effectiveness
analyses performed at a I0 percent rate of discount. The allowable
non-recurring costs for developing a fully reusable Space Transporta-
tion System are increased by about 25 percent when compared to the
"Equal Capability" analyses of the same scenarios. The "Equal Budget"
line shows, for each scenario, what the economic return is, if each
space program had allowed for the same funding level as that required
by Current Expendable technology. Again, the economic analyses give
results that fit very closely the "Equal Budget" line shown in Figure 0. I0
and lend themselves to similar conclusions as gained from the results
presented in Figure 0.9, both at discount rates--in real terms-- of
I0 percent. With the "Equal Budget" analyses, a non-recurring cost
of the new, fully reusable Space Transportation System of $12.8 billion
(undiscounted 1970 dollars) would be justified, at i0 percent, by a
space flight program requiring an annual funding of $2.0 billion for
NASA and the Department of Defense (launch costs and payload costs).
The MATHEMATICA Baseline space program (Scenario 3) for the
1980's now yields allowable non-recurring costs for a New Space
Transportation System of about $19.5 billion (undiscounted 1970 dollars).
The NASA and Department of Defense requirements of Scenario 1 yield
a comparable, allowable non-recurring cost of about $23.7 billion. The
historic expenditure level of the United States unmanned space program
0-42
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gives an "Equal Budget" figure close to $22. 1 billion.
United States were to continue to spend for scientific,
That is, if the
defense and
I
I
I
commercial space applications (the unmanned U. S. space program)
similar funds as in the 1960's, the economic analysis shows that the I
New Space Transportation System would still be an economic investment
with a i0 percent rate of return if it cost $22.1 billion in non-recurrin___g_g I
outlays (RDT&E and Fleet Investment). In this example, as in all
others, we assume that the non-recurring launch vehicle costs are
distributed proportionately over time in the same way as shown in
Table 0. i.
The strongest, most conservative results of the economic
analysis are shown, however, in Figure 0. ii. In the analyses sum-
marized in this figure, MATHEMATICA proceeded on an "Equal Capa-
bility" cost effectiveness basis for all space programs listed. In addition
to this, MATHEMATICA excluded in these calculations--at i0 percent--
volume and mass (weight) related payload effects that may also be realized
with expendable systems. MATHEMATICA included reduced space pro-
gram payload costs due to the reuse and refurbishment capability of
satellites made possible by a fully reusable Space Transportation System.
With this analysis the new, fully reusable Space Transportation System
breaks even at a space program of 566 flights (1978-1990), or about
44 flights a year (cf. Figure 0. 11). The economic analyses, at i0 per-
cent, still indicate allowable non-recurring costs for "buying" a fully
reusable Space Transportation System of:
a. $12.9 billion for the projected space program in
Scenario 3;
b. $15.4 billion for the projected space program in
Scenario I; and
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"EQUAL CAPABILITY" COST ANALYSES
(NET MASS EFFECTS, 10% DISCOUNT RATE)
• DATA POINTS FOR VARIOUS SCENARIOS
(_) DATA POINT FOR SCENARIO I (NASA & DaD Baseline. 756 flts, 57flts/yr)
=_]= BREAK EVEN POINT (566 fits, "44 flts/yr, 1978-1990)
/ / ,,ESTIMATED NON-RECURRING SPACE SHUTTLE +TUG COSTS (5/31/71)
12 II 24 I0 3 23 I _... Scenario number
49-_" 547 562 585 600 67"--'8 73---'6 -"' Number of flights
| | ! ! I l
o _o,2.8_ ----------- -----------5 I0
I-- _j
m
I I I I I w m I I
500 600 700 800
R2= 0.95
I I I
900
,=
!%)
I
NUMBER OF SHUTTLE FLIGHTS (1978-1990)
Figure O. ii
Ce $14.6 billion for the historic flight and funding level
of the unmanned United States space program of the
1960's.
All of these allowable funds are expressed in undiscounted
1970 dollars.
If the development of the two-stage, fully reusable Space Shuttle
now being considered by NASA were delayed by one year--with a corres-
ponding shift of the Initial Operating Capability date--the results from
our economic analysis do change, but not significantly. This conclusion
is, of course, predicated on the assumption that engineering research
and advanced development in the critical areas of the Space Shuttle
technology are continued. Similar economic results also hold for a
reduction in the rate of the phase-in of the Space Shuttle after its intro-
duction into operation. The scenarios identified as I0, ii and iZ in
Figures 0.9, 0. I0 and 0. ii, show the economic effects of phasing-in
the Space Shuttle over successively longer periods holding the Initial
Operating Capability date constant at 1978, while the space program
objectives of Scenario 3 are maintained. Scenario I0 phases the Space
Shuttle in over a two-year period (1980). For that scenario (538 flights),
this delay in the full operation date from 1978 to 1980 reduces the eco-
nomically justifiable non-recurring program costs from a range of
$14.5 billion to $19.5 billion to a range of $14.2 billion to $18.9 billion.
The likely economic gains from slippage or stretch-out--with continued
or increased funding of research and advanced technology--are greater
cost certainty and potential RDT&E cost reductions due to the possibilities
of more certain, flexible development scheduling. The economic costs
of slippage or stretch-out are the foregone reductions in the expected
recurring costs of the space program for the year(s) 1978,... in which
the Space Shuttle and Tug System is not available--including increased
payload costs.
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Figure 0. 12 and Figure 0. 13 show the influence of the different
rates of discount used on the results of the economic analyses. MATHE-
MATICA recommends a I0 percent discount rate as abasis for evaluating the
New Space Transportation Systems funding. Nevertheless, Figure 0. 12
shows the summary of economic analyses when the evaluation is made
at 15 percent on an "Equal Capability" basis. At this high a discount
rate the relative advantage of the Space Shuttle naturally decreases.
Yet, even with a 15 percent rate of discount and the conservative "Equal
Capability" analyses, the fully reusable Space Transportation System
does break even at a space program of 845 flights (1978-1990 total) or
65 flights a year. The summary of results indicates that up to $ii. 4 billion
could be spent on a new, fully reusable STS program, if the NASA-Depart-
ment of Defense model for the 1980's were taken as baseline. At MATHE-
MATICA's projection of unmanned space activities for the 1980's, the
Space Transportation System investment would have an allowable, non-
recurring cost of $9.4 billion (at 15 percent) , a figure too low to
cover the expected non-recurring costs of the new, fully reusable Space
Transportation System as estimated by Aerospace Corporation, the
•Phase B contractors and various centers of NASA.
Figure 0. 13 shows the summary of economic analyses performed
at a 5 percent discount rate, which gives much higher allowable non-
recurring costs since the opportunity cost of time is valued here rela-
tively low, at 5 percent. For Scenario 3, the allowable non-recurring
costs increase to nearly $30.0 billion.
Figure 0. 14 is a summary of all economic calculations that were
performed at I0 percent, i.e., for "Equal Budget" cost effectiveness,
for "Equal Capability" cost effectiveness, and for "Reuse-Refurbishment-
Update Payload Effects" only. It also shows MATHEMATICA' s estimate
of the historic flight and funding levels of the eUnited States and of the USSR,
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"EQUAL CAPABILITY" COST ANALYSES (15% DISCOUNTRATE)
• DATA POINTS FOR VARIOUS SCENARIOS
(_) DATA POINT FOR SCENARIO I (NASA & DaD Baseline: 736 fits, 57 flts/yr)
BREAK EVEN POINT (845 flis,--, 65 flts/yr, 1978-1990)
J" -" -ESTIMATED NON-RECURRING SPACE SHUTTLE+ TUG COSTS (3/31/71)
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in terms of equivalent Space Shuttle flights (the vertical lines).
Figure 0.15 shows the impact on the economic evaluation of
the Space Shuttle System of the addition of the NASA Lunar Option I.
The net increase in economic benefits is due to launch cost savings
only since lunar payloads have not been included in the analysis. (The
exclusion of Lunar Option payloads, however, cannot adversely affect
the economic analysis since some of the payloads may well exhibit
favorable cost effects when the Space Shuttle System is used.) The
incremental cost savings have been converted into allowable non-recur-
ring costs, and for all scenarios considered, as shown in Figure 0. 15,
this amounts to an additional $3.0 billion. The allowable non-recurring
cost for the Space Shuttle System evaluated for Equal Capability under
Scenario 3 and a I0 percent discount rate is $17.5 billion with Lunar
Option 1 and, excluding Lunar Option i, it is $14.5 billion. The important
conclusion to be drawn from this result is that when some large lunar
or planetary (or defense) space flight option is considered for the 1980's
the Space Shuttle System offers economic advantages also in terms of
transportation costs only. These have not been included in any of the
other MATHEMATICA scenarios.
Figure 0.16, finally, summarizes the economic calculations
clone at different discount rates (5 percent, i0 percent, and 15 percent)
for the "Equal Capability" cost effectiveness analyses.
The complete set of economic analyses performed by MATHE-
MATICA on which these results are based, at discount rates from one
to 20 percent, and the statistical backup to judge the quality of these
results--as conditioned by the validity of the input cost data--are given
in Chapter 7.0 of the Report.
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"EQUAL CAPAP41_ITY" COST ANALYSES WITH LUNAR
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Figures 0. 17, 0.18 and 0.19 depict the budgetary implications
of the following three space programs: Scenario 3, the MATHEMATICA
Baseline projection; Scenario 23 which is based on the historic funding
level of II.S. programs from Fiscal Years 1963 to 1971; and, Scenario Z4,
which is based on projections of FY 1970 and FY 1971 funding levels.
The Current Expendable funding level in Scenario 23 is about $3 billion
(NASA and Department of Defense) and in Scenario Z4 it is $2.5 billion.
The expected costs for new SpaceTransportation System operations at
the same funding level ("Equal Capability") are also shown.
Figures 0.20 and 0.21 consider the addition of the NASA Lunar
Option I transportation costs to the life cycle costs of Scenarios I and 3.
This Lunar option assumes the existence of a Nuclear Space Shuttle for
Earth orbit to Lunar orbit transportation. The Lunar payload costs have
not been included, and potential Space Shuttle payload effects for this
traffic has not been allowed for.
All the life cycle costs for transportation and payload costs are
given in detail in Chapter 6.0.
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SPACE PROGRAM COSTS (1978-1990 OPERATIONS)
SCENARIO 3 (Funding B0sis Described in Text)
CURRENT EXPENDABLE SYSTEM vs SPACE SHUTTLE AND TUG SYSTEM
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SPACE PROGRAM COSTS (1978-1990 OPERATIONS)
SCENARIO 24 (Bosed on U.S. Funding, 1970-1971)
CURRENT EXPENDABLE SYSTEM vs SPACE SHUTTLE AND TUG. SYSTEM
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0.5 CONCLUSIONS
I. The most conservative economic analyses show, at a
I0 percent social discount rate, that the allowable non-recurring costs
for "buying" a fully reusable Space Transportation System are:
a. $12.9 billion for an annual activity level of 46 Space
Shuttle flights (Scenario 3).
b. $15.4 billion for an annual activity level of 56 Space
Shuttle flights (Scenario I).
c. $14.6 billion for the historic flight level of the
unmanned United States space program of the 1960's,
corresponding to 51 Space Shuttle flights (Scenario Z3).
The present estimate of the actual non-recurring costs of the
Space Shuttle and Tug System is $1Z. 8 billion. All of these estimates
are made in constant (1970) dollars.
Z. The major economic potential identified for Space Trans-
portation Systems in the 1980's is the lowering of space program costs
due to the reuse, refurbishment and updating of satellite payloads. The
fully reusable, two-stage Space Shuttle is a major system--but conceivably
not the only system--identified to achieve this reuse, refurbishment, and
updating of payloads. Other technically acceptable systems should be
studied to determine the extent and the cost at which they can achieve
reuse, refurbishment and updating of payloads. Any such studies must
be performed in adequate depth to generate meaningful comparative data
for an economic evaluation.
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The cost reductions originate in three distinct areas: (a) the
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) phase of new
payloads (satellites); (b) the unit cost and operating cost of payloads
(satellites) for different space missions; (c) the cost of launching pay-
loads into orbit.
Although it is, perhaps; natural to identify the economic effects
of a reusable Space Transportation System primarily as reductions in
launch costs, it is apparent that the major cost savings lie in the area
of payload development, construction and operation. For example, with
the Expendable System, launch costs constitute only 20 to 25 percent of
the cost of a typical United States space program; 75 to 80 percent are
payload related costs (see payload costs and recurring launch costs of
Table 0.1).
3. The currently projected non-recurring costs associated
with developing a Space Shuttle and Tug are shown by the economic analy-
sis to be covered by the identified benefits, provided the United States
intends to operate a space program with a number of flights equal to the
unmanned space program activities of the United States in the 1960's.
The direct costs (payload and transportation) of space activity
carried out by a Space Shuttle System are expected to be about one-half
of the direct costs of the Current Expendable Space Transportation
System.
These conclusions are based on what MATHEMATICA considers
to be realistic and, indeed, conservative projections of space activities
in the 1980's--with most of the projected unmanned space programs
operating below the level maintained during the 1960's, and with the
manned space flight program limited to about $200 million a year.
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The analysis of the lunar option has shown that the Space
Shuttle System offers economic advantages also in terms of transporta-
tion costs only, when some large lunar or planetary (or defense) space
flight options are considered for the 1980's. Due to the great uncertainty
of these options being adopted by the United States, MATHEMATICA did
not allow for these advantages in the basic conclusions.
4. The choice of the social discount rate has a major
influence on the economics of a new Space Transportation System.
Differences in the rate applied to the analysis outweigh many other
important issues usually raised--and analyzed--in the context of large
scale RDT&E projects, including uncertainties in the cost data.
5. The economic justification of a reusable Space Transpor-
tation System is independent of the question of manned versus unmanned
space flight. The space programs used and analyzed by MATHEMATICA
are in line with the activity and funding levels of the unmanned United
States space program of the 1960's (NASA, DoD, and commercial users
included). This does not preclude the possibility that the future unmanned
Space program can be much larger than in the past.
6. This Report analyzes the economically allowable non-
recurring costs of a reusable Space Transportation System. The task of
identifying the best reusable Space Transportation System among all the
viable alternatives requires equally detailed economic consideration.
7. Finally, we state with emphasis: any investment can only
be justified by its _oals. This applies to business as well as to govern-
ment, hence also NASA. A new, reusable Space Transportation System
should only be introduced if it can be shown, conclusively, what it is to
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be used for and that the intended uses are meaningful to those who
have to appropriate the funds, and to those from whom the funds a.re
raised, as well as to the various government agencies that undertake
space activities. The space goals can be military (to meet military
space efforts of other countries or use the potential of space to meet
needs of national security), scientific (e. g., astronomy, environment),
commercial (e. g. , earth resources applications, communications,
weather forecasting) or political (rivalry with the space programs of
other countries). All these goals will, of course, be mixed into one
national space program, representing to various degrees a joint de-
mand for space transportation with a varying mix of payloads.
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